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INTRODUCTION 
In this short presentation, I would like to take a quick look at the timely theme of this, our 
23rd Congress, entitled "Social Economy and Public Economy: New Forms of Cooperation in an 
Era of Globalization". With the advent of globalization, the rediscovery of civil society and the 
growing importance of the knowledge-based economy, governments are increasingly relying on 
partnerships, strategies alliances, system linkages and networking. It must be remembered that the 
theme of this congress refers less to the dominant actors and neo-corporatism of the 1960s and 
1970s, than to the new forms for coordinating economic activity and relationships among private 
firms and between these firms and other institutions, such as universities and unions. The 
existence of these partnerships demonstrates that, irrespective of geographical location (1) there 
are limits to competition, and (2) there is a need for cooperation in an economy that is more than 
ever making use of public property (Streeck, 1992). That said, it appears that the role and 
importance of partnerships vary considerably by enterprise, country and region, and this prompts 
us to account for the variety of approaches adopted on a national level and by various regional 
blocs. I believe that partnership will be a leading theme in the next few years, since it is likely to 
characterize both the new world that is emerging (Castelis, 1999) and the new "spirit of 
capitalism", a form of capitalism that is project-based (Boltanski et Chiapello, 1999). 
This presentation has three parts. In Part One, I will provide a broad outline of various approaches 
to the coordination of economic activity; this will allow us to clearly distinguish between, on one 
hand, new forms of cooperation involving partnerships and networks and, on the other hand, 
organizational forms such as holdings or cartels. In Part Two, I will situate the new forms of 
inter-organizational cooperation within what I think is likely to be a new development model, but 
what others call the new spirit of capitalism. In the Conclusion, I will identify the issues and 
challenges raised by these new forms of economic coordination, and that organizations of the 
public economy and the social economy will have to confront. Of course, at present there are more 
questions than answers, though the objective of this 23rd CIRIEC Congress is, indeed, to explore 
possible solutions during the discussions on each of the subtopics. 
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1. THE PARTNERSHIP AS A MECHANISM FOR COORDINATING ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 
The new forms of cooperation between enterprises have many designations: partnership, alliance 
agreement, coalition, consortium, two-way agreement, interface, network, relationship, joint 
venture, linkage, quasi-firm and others. Although the terms should not be employed 
interchangeably, they generally refer to contractual agreements among enterprises and 
organizations for the purposes of carrying out joint projects, even though each party keeps its own 
identity and autonomy. These forms of cooperation are growing in popularity. For example, 
according to a Columbia University study, joint ventures and alliances grew by 20 % in the second 
half of the 1980s, compared to 5 % in the first half (Wikstrom and Norman, 1994 : 41). The most 
successful American businesses were involved in at least three agreements to cooperate with other 
enterprises and other organizations, including universities (Hage et Alter, 1997 : 96). An OECD 
symposium of government officials and corporate managers reported that the profusion of 
collaborative alliances and relationships among firms was regarded by some participants as one of 
the most distinctive features of globalization, and as a new and prominent trait in the corporate 
strategies of several industries 1(OEDC, 1994 cited by Grant, 1997 : 329) Partnership is associated 
with local development and the concept of proximity (Dommergues, 1988; Storper, 1993; Piore et 
Sabel, 1984) in the same way that globalization goes hand in hand with the revival of local 
initiatives and decentralisation (Castells,1999 : 422).,  
Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997 : 12) have proposed a typology of mechanisms for economic 
coordination. This typology reveals the structure of the new forms of cooperation between 
enterprises and the new forms of governance. They plot the coordinates (see Graph 1 : Forms of 
coordination and governance) of networks, joint ventures, strategy alliances, and other types of 
agreement between firms, on a quadrilateral in which the two intersecting axes represent, 
respectively, the division of power and the motive for taking action; on one axis, the two 
extremities are "the market" and "hierarchy"; on the other axis, the authors pit pursuit of self-
interest against the logic of reciprocity and obligation; in sum, the new types of agreement are 
portrayed as hybrids. This graph provides a very good schematic representation for clearly 
distinguishing the new forms of cooperation among enterprises (i) from those of the vertically 
integrated firm where, like any hierarchy, there is an unequal distribution of power, and (ii) from 
pure competition (without mutual obligations or power relationships among traders). The diagram 
illustrates the difference between, on one hand, holdings and conglomerates, and on the other 
hand, new forms of cooperation created by networks, alliances and joint ventures, etc. 
                                                 
1 The OECD Symposium of Government Officials and Corporate Managers reported that the profusion of collaborative alliances and 
relationships among firms was regarded by some participants as one of the most distinctive features of globalization and as a new and 
prominent trait in corporate strategies of several industries (OECD, 1994 : 192 : Grant : 329.) 
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The authors reveal that the new forms of cooperation consist of diverse mixtures of pursuit of 
self-interest and social responsibility displayed by actors who are formally independent and equal 
(even if the members of some networks do not have equal power and influence). Competition is 
not eliminated. Rather, it co-habits, so to speak, with forms of cooperation and agreement that 
emphasize reciprocity and the long term, even if this means overstepping the purely contractual 
aspects of an agreement. Networks and partnerships depend in part on the market and in part on 
medium and long-term agreements. The State has a different type of coordinating mechanism: it 
sanctions and regulates other coordinating mechanisms. It also supplies goods and services and 
sets up government enterprises to serve the public interest; these enterprises encourage and 
empower economic actors to cooperate by developing long-term agreements, and discourage the 
type of economic rationality that avoids long-term considerations. 
Each coordinating mechanism has its own rules, methodology, norms, ideology, strengths and 
weaknesses. The market – as a coordinating mechanism – is better suited to dealing with divisible 
private property than with public services, such as education, research and innovation, 
transportation and infrastructure. While the market allows for decentralisation and the 
independence of traders, it does not promote sustainable relationships or agreements with a long-
term horizon. On the other hand, mechanisms that rely on hierarchy, such as large vertically 
integrated firms, can easily take on a longer-term orientation, but this may involve sacrificing the 
flexibility and autonomy of their personnel Partnerships, such as certain types of joint ventures, 
provide the advantages of mergers while avoiding its disadvantages. In such cases, the partners 
can benefit from pooling their assets without losing their identity or their control over their own 
assets. They can even form other partnerships to tap owner products and markets. Indeed, in this 
way partnerships allow for a contract-based growth that is different from internal growth or 
growth of an asset base built on financial power (Chevalier, 1999). As Hollingsworth and Boyer 
state (1997 : 19): "The issue is not to select one coordinating mechanism but to combine both 
according to the nature of the objectives, the resources, and the characteristics of the goods"2. To 
find the appropriate balance, different forms of coordination select different models of 
development. 
                                                 
2 ‘The issue is not to select one coordinating mechanism but to combine both according to the nature of the objectives, the resources, and 
the characteristics of the goods’ (Boyer et Hollingsworth, 1997 : 19). 
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2. THE PARTNERSHIP AS AN ELEMENT OF A NEW DEVELOPMENT MODEL 
The new forms of economic coordination, such as cooperation and partnership, are consistent with 
a new, emerging model of development; the type of governance that made use of hierarchy and 
managed economies was consistent with an old model that many referred to as Fordist or 
Keynesien (Aglietta, 1976; Beaud and Dostaler, 1993). 
The limits to Fordism were first pointed out by the counter-cultural movements of the late 1960s, 
in their questioning of mass consumption, then by the labour movement of the early 1970s, in their 
opposition to standardized work and the Taylorist division of labour (W.E Upjohn Institute, 1973). 
From an economic regulation perspective, stagflation (inflation combined with high 
underemployment) cast doubt on Keynesian assumptions and even the ability of the State to meet 
the employment challenge in economies that were increasingly opening up to the world. At the 
same time, large firms involved in mass production demonstrated that they were unable to respond 
rapidly to new consumer demands or to problems of the environment. (Piore et Sabel, 1984). 
Stated differently, the 1980s were by and large characterized by a questioning of private hierarchy, 
as embodied by large firms, and by the public hierarchy of the State. Thus, General Motors (GM) 
and the USSR failed miserably as a result of their institutional rigidities, which prevented them 
from innovating and adapting in a context of rapid change. In sum, the dominant forms of 
governance, based at that time on hierarchy, economic rationality and regulatory control, were 
unable to take advantage of the potential for flexibility and integration provided by the new 
information technologies and that required that economies open up to the world. 
To meet the new social and economic challenges, innovative firms not only invested in modern 
technology, but also experimented with new forms of governance and new forms of work 
organization that emphasized versatility in work tasks, work teams and worker participation 
(Bélanger, Grant, Lévesque, 1994). Consumer relations became increasingly client-oriented, with 
the result that in many respects the entire economy became a service economy; from that point 
forward competition centred as much on quality as on prise (Gadrey, 1996). The large, 
hierarchical, private firms were transformed, and now promoted smaller factories and outsourcing 
considered too removed from its principal activities. In the process, it became obvious that the 
flexibility and integration made possible by the new information technologies could not realize 
their full potential without the cooperation of the workers and sub-contractors. As Porter (1990) 
has shown, the quality of the relationships that a firm maintains with its suppliers and clients can 
provide a competitive edge. Lastly, the opening up of markets pushed firms to focus on their 
principal activity and to embark on an unprecedented cycle of innovation and research and 
development. Similarly, the State refocused on its hard-core or principal functions, namely, 
regulation and redistribution, partially abandoning to the private sector activities involving 
production and infrastructure management. 
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8 
Experimentation in State regulation and in the control exercised by firms adopted a new structure; 
it now involves the market, the State and civil society3. As such, the new governance comprised 
elements from each of the three sectors, bursting the overly rigid boundaries between the social 
sphere and the economic sphere. This new approach placed the emphasis on non-market 
interdependence (which was not totally economic in nature); this interdependence exists or can be 
created between individuals and organizations (trust, social cohesion and proximity reduce 
transaction costs), between firms in the same sector (industrial clusters and the new linking of 
values), between firms and their environment (ex. innovative environments, industrial zones that 
promote training and collective assets) (Julien, 1994; Streeck,1992; Salais).Thus, alongside the 
market (competition) and hierarchy (authority), cooperation through association, networks and 
partnership were virtually automatic requirements when it came to coordinating economic activity, 
and as a source of value. In this way, firms were invited to take on functions that belonged to the 
State and that were until then considered exclusively as part of the public domain (Monnier et 
Thiry, 1997). In a similar way, the local communities that form zones of "citizen solidarity" and 
the unions that represent the collective interest of the workers become more amenable to dialogue 
and partnership because it is both in their own interest and in the general interest. 
These changes in production may be observed at the global as well as the local level. (Piore et 
Sabel, 1984; Saxenian, 1994). Although globalization is in certain respects an ideology, it 
nevertheless embodies real changes that distinguish it from internationalization. With 
globalization, national boundaries no longer constitute a significant obstacle to the movement of 
goods and services (Grant, 1997 : 319); in addition, globalization is characterized by "a 
multiplicity of competing innovative methods originating in various locations around the world" 
(Coriat, 1997 : 242). Globalization gives rise to tremendous competitive pressures and a great deal 
of uncertainty with regard to investment. In order to reduce the uncertainties and share the risks 
that prevail in this environment, the market-as-coordinating-mechanism must be complemented by 
forms of collaboration that accentuate trust and the long term. Once this is achieved, the new 
forms of cooperation reduce competition and transaction costs to a lesser degree than those 
stemming from innovation and adaptation (Hage et Aller, 1997). In contrast to cartels that focus on 
pries and quantity, the new forms of agreement provide ways to open up new markets, develop 
new products and facilitate access to new technologies; they represent a new stage in 
organizational forms, that is, a new way of thinking about inter-firm relations and the relevance of 
economic behaviour, including agreements with universities, associations and unions. This 
openness proves all the more necessary as the econorny becomes knowledge based (Rosell, 1999). 
We thus see that this system of governance is generally much more complex than hierarchical 
coordination since the various parties remain independent and there is wider involvement in the 
decision-making process (Hage and Alter, 1997 : 96). Forms that emphasize cooperation also 
differ from coordination by the market since they activate decision makers, thereby drawing on a 
"visible hand", to use an expression employed by Alfred Chandler (1977). Thus, in the partnership 
type of governance, suppliers are more likely to be chosen as a result of a selection process than on 
the basis of requests for proposals. After this process, the parties must negotiate the conditions of 
                                                 
3 Stands for Assocations, Syndicates, Social Economy and Local Collectivities. 
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their collaboration and invest in group training. Seen in this way, the "new partnership is a social 
procedure of building and sharing in long-term relationships [implying the] establishment of 
routines and multiple procedures [that] have bonded agents together with forms of coordination 
and arbitration that are essentially non-commercial" (Coriat, 1997 : 259). As a result, governance 
that emphasizes partnership and cooperation relies increasingly on "a model for interaction that 
places greater emphasis on factors outside the firm, particularly interaction, training, and the 
sharing of knowledge and social and institutional infrastructure" (Landry et al, 1999 : 7). In this 
context, the State tends to play the role of catalyst and broker, promoting agreements among 
economic and non-economic partners, especially when it comes to conquering external markets. 
Paradoxically, the local sphere, too, lends itself increasingly to new forms of collaboration 
between firms and economically relevant social forces, such as universities, unions and citizen 
groups. The mobilisation of local actors is two-pronged. First, there are local initiatives that deal 
with problems that large firms and the State cannot resolve, such as the conversion of certain 
industrial zones consisting of older industries (Klein and Lévesque, 2000). Second, there are 
innovative environments and new industrial zones that mobilise local forces to conquer external 
markets (Piore et Sabel, 1984). In this way, so-called "smart communities" come into being; their 
aim is to insert cities or towns into the knowledge-based economy. These communities consist of 
"geographical zones, ranging in size from a few adjacent communities to several municipalities; 
their residents, organizations and governing institutions benefit by employing information 
technologies and work in partnership to improve their situation". Here, "cooperation among 
governing institutions, industries, educators and citizens is preferable to isolated initiatives. The 
technological changes introduced by the Smart communities are comprehensive rather than 
incremental". (Smart Communities Guidebook, 1997, cited by Landry et al, 1999 : 52). 
Lastly, the upgrading of the local sphere and local forces is consistent with a system of production 
and firms that stresses flexibility and integration, rapid response to demand organizational culture, 
zero stock, just-in-time methods, etc. As Hollingsworth and Boyer put it (1997 : 27): "Cooperation 
among competing producers, a minimum of conflict between employers and their employees, and 
long-term stable relations with suppliers and customers are prerequisites to the survival of flexible 
production Systems". In sum, the proximity of suppliers, the involvement of workers and the 
differentiation of products by quality, now prompts firms, more than ever, to take into account the 
specifies characteristics of the local sphere. This new vision of the local sphere is accompanied by 
a re-assessment not only of the relationship between what is economy and what is social, but also 
of their respective content. Thus, by using proximity-based relations, the upgraded local sphere 
mobilises social resources. From that point on, it is not enough to simply couple science and the 
market; firms must also dovetail with the actors in each milieu by creating networks for 
collaboration and exchange of knowledge that involve clients, suppliers, consultants, government 
agencies, university-based researchers, researchers in government laboratories, etc. (Landry et al, 
1999 : 21) 
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In sum, the market and other coordinating mechanisms are influenced by social production 
systems, including the system of industrial relations; training systems; the internal structures of 
terms; the relations between firms and their suppliers and clients; the importance of publicly 
owned companies and the social economy relative to the private sector, conceptions of justice and 
equity involving labour and capital; and customs and national traditions, etc. Forms of governance 
vary considerably; they depend on the society, and may even vary within a society (by form of 
local production, for example). A complex system of institutions influences the forms of 
cooperation; in the United States, networks of universities and private firms are the predominant 
form; in Germany, firms, associations and the State collaborate in the area of professional and 
technical training; Italy, particularly the "Third Italy" has its industrial zones (Piore and Sabel, 
1984; Benko and Lipietz, 2000). 
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CONCLUSION  
Issues and Challenges for Publicly Owned Companies and the Social Economy 
Partnerships, which play a central role in the new forms of governance, are important to firms that 
wish to capture world markets; many local development initiatives also use them. This is both 
good and bad news for publicly owned firms and enterprises of the social economy. I do not wish 
to pass Soloman's judgement on partnerships, but I believe that they pose a threat as well as 
provide opportunities. 
1. They are a threat to the extent that, compared to publicly owned companies and to the social 
economy, private firms seem to enjoy greater flexibility and mobility. The result is that they find it 
easier to establish their market position, especially outside their home country, and to exercise 
greater autonomy in their choice of partners, When private firms seek to capture foreign markets 
and develop partnerships with other firms, one of which is a national, publicly owned firm, this 
makes the home company seem more relevant in the public eye. There is therefore a danger that 
the State will limit its role almost exclusively to that of broker for projects of private firms, without 
raising questions about the content of the development project itself. In addition, some southern 
nations criticize publicly owned companies of northern nations for acting as agents of privatisation 
(created through partnerships in the country of origin). The danger is even greater, given that 
globalization was not accompanied by the development of appropriate mechanisms for governance 
at the supra-national level, at least not within the framework of NAFTA; in addition, publicly 
owned companies and the social economy received hardly recognition at this level 
(Grant, 1997 : 319). Lastly, a multinational firm that does not establish real roots in a country 
where it is conducting business (the stateless firm) constitutes an approach that is entirely alien to 
publicly owned firms and the social economy. 
The fact that enterprises of the social economy have greater difficulty forming partnerships with 
publicly owned firms than with private firms threatens the future of the social economy. 
Partnerships with private firms force enterprises that are supposed to act in the general and 
collective interest to apply standards of profitability employed by the private sector. This is all the 
more threatening since the coordination methods of the partnership remain ambiguous, given that 
they fail to put a halt to competition, conflict and opportunistic behaviour. Unless it arises in a 
favourable institutional context and allows for serious negotiation between the parties, the 
partnership will probably result in paternalism or become a phoney partnership; this is all the more 
likely when large private firms – and sometimes even large firms that are publicly owned or that 
form part of the social economy – form partnerships with small enterprises of the social economy 
(Kernaghan, 1993 : 65). The dangers are ail the more ominous when they involve social 
development in which the State is the principal partner of small enterprises or of organizations that 
belong to the social economy (Lamoureux, 1994 : 186). 
Thus, to achieve real partnership it is absolutely necessary to recognize that all parties have useful 
expertise and resources, and that through negotiation there is the possibility for collaboration. If the 
partnership cannot flourish without agreements and compromises among parties with divergent 
interests, then it will have to resort to an institutional framework to accommodate the differing 
CAHIERS DU CRISES – COLLECTION ÉTUDES THÉORIQUES – NO ET0502 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
viewpoints and determine what conditions are necessary to carry out a joint project successfully. 
Once these requirements are met, the partnership will be in a position to create a sort of intangible 
capital, a company capital consisting of knowledge (Deloncourt, 1993), networks (Putnam, 1993) 
and the ability to cooperate (Coleman, 1990). 
2. In addition, and as I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this presentation, the types of 
governance based on partnership offer a wide array of opportunities, both locally and globally. Due 
to their legal status and their objective of acting in the general and collective interest, publicly 
owned firms and enterprises of the social economy would, for the purposes of partnership and 
cooperation, provide a more solid foundation than private firms. In the field of cooperation, 
including development cooperation, there is a long tradition of cooperation, both at the national 
and international levels. Although these partnerships are generally sector-based, the rediscovery of 
the local sphere gave rise to numerous intersectorial initiatives for cooperation and partnership; we 
will, no doubt, have the opportunity to hear about these in the various workshops of this congress. 
Partnership could also open up the public economy and the social economy, and extend their 
influence so as to generate a "new mixed economy", to use an expression employed by Anthony 
Giddens (1998 : 69). This new mixed economy would be different from the one that emerged in 
the 1950s inasmuch as it would manifest itself more as a plural economy than as an economy of 
relatively self-sufficient mega projects. In the new mixed economy, firms in the public economy 
and enterprises of the social economy would have the ability to "contaminate" private firms, so to 
speak, by making them support objectives that promoted the general interest; these objectives 
would be based on mechanisms that were relatively binding, such as shareholder agreements. 
Lastly, in the new forms of governance, partnerships can mobilise social forces that are growing 
and diversifying. For example, the participation of unions might be based on the working venture 
funds and pension funds that they control; community groups (or associations) would participate 
within the framework of local development projects and universities would get involved on the basis 
of their expertise with the new economy. These new partners gravitate almost naturally toward a 
collective interest that is open to the general interest. Moreover, in situations of conflict, participants 
from civil society prefer discussion and negotiation (voice) to dropping out (exit) (Neuville, 1997 : 301). 
As a result, in more favourable conditions, partnerships could help democratize the economy. 
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